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TRESPASS-ABSOLUTE LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT IN
KENTUCKY
In the eyes of the common law every unauthorized entry upon
the soil of another was a trespass. It was immaterial whether the
entry was intentional, or whether it was purely accidental and
without fault. So long as the defendant did an act which resulted
in an entry upon the realty of another, he was liable in trespass.2
Liability was enforced for these entries by the actions of
trespass and trespass on the case.2 Trespass arose out of an injury
which was caused by a direct act, while case arose out of an injury
which was indirectly caused.2
With the passing of time this procedural distinction between
trespass and case was abandoned, and case, being more convenient,
was extended to include injuries which were merely negligent,
while the action of trespass remained for those wrongs which were
intentional.
Of the surviving rules of trespass, one of the most difficult to
rationalize is that which imposes absolute liability for all damage
resulting from invasions of real property which were neither in-
tended nor negligent.' Kentucky is one of the jurisdictions which
has blindly followed that rule heedless of a trend toward a require-
ment of negligence or intent.
'I STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) pp. 19-25. Cf.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) pp. 77-129. (It is Holmes'
theory that there was never a doctrine of absolute liability for tres-
pass to realty at common law.)
2 111 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) pp. 252-
253. Here the language of Chief Justice Raymond in the case of
Reynolds v. Clark (1725) 1 Strange 634, 93 Eng. Rep. 747, is quoted:
"The distinction in law is, where the immediate act itself occasions
a prejudice, or is an injury to the plaintiff's person, house, land, etc.,
and where the act itself is not an injury, but a consequence from
that act is prejudicial to the plaintiff's person, house, land, etc. In
the first case trespass vi et armis will lie; in the last it will not, but
the plaintiff's proper remedy is by an action on the case."
'Leame v. Bray (1803) 3 East 593, 102 Eng. Rep. 724. The case
of Reynolds v. Clark, cited supra note 2, gives the classical illustra-
tion of the distinction between trespass and case: " . . . if a man
throws a log into the highway, and in that act it hits me; I may
maintain trespass, because it is an immediate wrong; but if as it
lies there I tumble over it, and receive an injury, I must bring an
action upon the case; because it is only prejudicial in consequence,
for which originally I could have no action at all ..
4 PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 38.
5Van Alstyne v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 163 Misc. 258, 296 N. Y.
S. 726 (1937); Wheeler v. Norton, 92 App. Div. 368, 86 N. Y. S. 1095
(1904); McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson (Tex. Civ. App.) 70 S. W. 2d 618
(1934).
STUDENT NOTES
In the case of Louisville Railway Company v. Sweeney,: the
plaintiff, while standing in her own yard, was injured when a street
car belonging to the defendant left the tracks and struck a telephone
pole which fell against a gate causing it to strike the plaintiff. The
court told the jury in substance that if they believed from the evi-
dence that the car left the track and ran against the pole and that
the pole was thereby thrown against the gate and the gate was
thereby caused to strike the plaintiff and she was thereby injured,
they should find for her. A verdict for the plaintiff was sustained
and the instruction was approved on the ground that this was a tres-
pass, making it unnecessary for the plaintiff to show negligence on
the part of the defendant.
This doctrine of absolute liability for injury sustained through
trespass to realty has been followed in Kentucky where a spool of
wire, under the control of defendant's employee, slid from a sled
and rolled down a hill and through the house of the plaintiff;
7 and
where a slate car ran uncontrolled down an incline, and slate was
thrown into a house, injuring the plaintiff
There is a trend away from this old common law idea of abso-
lute liability for trespass to realty in both England and the United
States. In the English case of Peacock v. Nicholson: the defendant's
servant was driving his horse and cab down the street when the
horse slipped and a breeching was broken. The servant tried to turn
down a side street and in so doing ran into the shop of the plaintiff.
There was failure to show negligence, and no showing of intention
and the court refused recovery in trespass.
Parrott v. Wells Fargo & Co.," the famous Nitroglycerine Case,
is a leading case in the United States opposed to the rule of liability
without fault where there is trespass to realty. The defendants, on
premises leased by them, were opening a box which was leaking an
oily fluid when there was an explosion which damaged the ad-
joining property owned by the plaintiffs. There was a failure to
show negligence or intent and the court refused recovery for
trespass.
The view adopted by the Restatement of Torts is:
1
"Except where the actor is engaged in an extra-hazardous
activity, an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in the
possession of another or causing a thing or third person to enter
the land, does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor,
'157 Ky. 620, 163 S. W. 739 (1914). See also, Kentucky Trac-
tion & Terminal Co. v. Bain, 174 Ky. 679, 192 S. W. 656 (1917).
'Happy Coal Co. v. Smith, 229 Ky. 716, 17 S. W. 2d 1008 (1929).
'Consolidated Fuel Co. v. Stevens, 223 Ky. 192, 3 S. W. 2d 203
(1927).
(1891) 1 Q. B. 86, 11 L. T. R. 225.
" 15 Wall 524 (U. S. 1872). See also, Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H.
442 (1873).
1RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) sec. 166.
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even though the entry caused harm to the possessor or to a
thing or third person in whose security the possessor has a
legally protected interest."
While there is reason for absolute liability in cases where the
instrumentality is dangerous, such as in blasting cases,' or, as in the
leading case of Rylands v. Fletcher where a large store of water is
maintained on a person's premises which may break loose and cause
injury to others, there is little reason for the rule when the instru-
mentality in use is not necessarily a dangerous one, if operated cor-
rectly. As stated by Prosser: "
"There is no great triumph of reason in a rule which makes
a street railway company, whose car jumps the track, liable
only for negligence to a pedestrian on the sidewalk but abso-
lutely liable to the owner of the plate glass window behind
him .... "
In regard to liability for unintentional and non-negligent en-
tries on land, Kentucky might well adopt the rational and common
sense view which would restrict the doctrine of absolute liability
to those cases where the actor is engaged in an extra-hazardous
activity.
GLENN W. DENHAm.v
'Allegheny Coke Co. v. Massey, 163 Ky. 792, 174 S. W. 499
(1915); Wendt v. Yant Const. Co., 125 Neb. 277, 249 N. W. 599
(1933).
(3 (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330. See also, Wilson v. City of New
Bedford, 108 Mass. 261, 11 Am. Rep. 352 (1879); Wiltse v. City of
Red Wing, 99 Minn. 255, 109 N. W. 114 (1906).
" PRossER, TORTS (1941) 77.
